Lord Howard convicted of a driving offence
Lady and Lord Howard |
At Wimbledon Magistrates’ Court on the 1st December
2016, Lord Howard was convicted of failing to identify the driver of a car belonging
to him, which was seen speeding. Lord Howard is a Queens Counsel and former
leader of the Conservative Party. He served as Home Secretary under John Major
and frequently clashed with judges. One decision made by Lord Howard to set a
minimum 15-year tariff to the life sentence imposed on the 10-year-old killers
of James Bulger was described by a retired senior appeal judge, Lord Donaldson,
as “institutionalised vengeance by a
politician playing to the gallery”.
The former party leader’s car was seen travelling at 37mph
on a road with a 30mph speed limit. A section 172 notice was sent to his home,
presumably with a notice of intended prosecution, and Lord Howard replied
saying he could not recall who was driving. He identified the other person who
might have been behind the wheel simply as “my wife”.
The law
Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act is a well-known
provision and many drivers will have received a “section 172 notice” requiring
them to name the driver on a particular day and time. The Act requires the keeper
of the vehicle to “give such information as
to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by” the police.
It also requires “any other person” to
provide “any information which it is in
power to give and may lead to the identification of the driver.” They are
most commonly sent out for speeding offences, but are occasionally used by
astute police officers to side-step suspects in drink driving cases who decide
to remain silent so as not to identify themselves as the driver. If the police
cannot prove a person was driving, they cannot secure a conviction for drink
driving. Often, the only evidence of driving comes from comments made by
suspects themselves, therefore a refusal to answer questions can throw a
prosecution into doubt. Officers will sometimes issue a s. 172 notice to force
the person to disclose whether they were driving or not. Since the offence
carries a discretionary disqualification, a court could decide to disqualify
the person if they refuse to comply often making it pointless to exercise the right
to silence in interview.
Failure to comply with a s. 172 notice carries a fine of up
to £1,000 plus six-penalty-points. Like most driving offences, the court can
always choose to impose a disqualification if they feel one is justified.
Section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 tells us that a
driver is not guilty if “… he did not
know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver of
the vehicle was”. It should be noted that “reasonable diligence” is a much
stricter test than simply having a think about it then throwing your hands up
in despair and saying “this is impossible”. It is necessary to make an effort
to discover the information if you do not know it. In Marshall v CPS, the Divisional Court suggested that drivers who
cannot remember which of the husband or wife was driving should go through the
chronology and manner of the driving on the night in question to work out the
answer. Mr Justice Parker in that case suggested that Mrs Marshall and her
husband may have worked out who was driving thus:
“… The following questions could have diligently explored: at what time
did she leave 16 Sloane Street, arrive at Nevern Place and return to Sloane
Street to leave for Richmond? The distance from Sloane Street westward along
the Cromwell Road to Kenway Road can be ascertained and the duration of the
relatively short journey at night reasonably estimated.
42. On the first working assumption that she herself had been driving
at the time of the alleged offence she could have sought to work out the
approximate time that she must have left 16 Sloane Street, reached Nevern Place
close to Kenway Road and then returned to Sloane Street to leave for Richmond.
43. If, on the other hand, Mr Marshall had been driving at the time of
the offence the relevant chronologically, whatever it might exactly have been,
must have been significantly different. Mr Marshall must on that working
assumption have left Sloane Street on the first occasion considerably earlier,
allowing her initially to drive Adele to Nevern Place, drop Adele off at the
residence, return to Sloane Street to collect Mr Marshall before setting off on
the final journey to Richmond. The final journey to Richmond must then have
been considerably earlier.”
What I think His Lordship is trying to say is that when you
think about who was driving you need to do more than just think about it, but
actually take some steps to try and piece together the information and work out
the answer based on the facts you do know.
The facts
Lord Howard told the court that he had been away on holiday
with his wife when the notice arrived so he did not receive it until
three-weeks after the alleged speeding offence. By that time the events were no
longer fresh in Lord Howard’s memory and he told the court, “I tried as hard as I could to remember who
was driving. It was almost a month before. I simply couldn't remember.”
Upon receiving the section 172 notice, Lord Howard did
respond telling the police that it could have been him or his wife who was
driving but that he had no idea which of them was behind the wheel at the time
of the speeding offence.
District Judge Barnes told Lord Howard that this wasn’t good
enough saying that, “[a]t no stage did the defendant provide the
particulars of his wife in his letter. To simply refer to his 'wife' does not
provide sufficient information.”
After hearing evidence from both Lord and Lady Howard, DJ
Barnes concluded that their evidence had been “credible”, which is judge for “the witness is probably telling the
truth”. The DJ convicted him anyway saying, “[t]he defendant did speak to his wife to try
and remember who was driving. They did rack their brains… At no stage did the
defendant provide the particulars of his wife in his letter. To simply refer to
his 'wife' does not provide sufficient information… The reasonable diligence
has not been made out and I'm not in a position to give any credit since there
was no plea of guilty."
Given the judge’s use of the phrase “They did rack their brains,” I would suggest that she felt the
Howard’s had done all that could be asked of them to remember, as per Marshall v CPS, and that they genuinely
did not know who was driving. It would appear then that the conviction is on
the technical basis that Lord Howard did not give the name and address of his
wife when completing the form.
Lord Howard has said that he intends to appeal the
conviction. He may choose to go to the Crown Court for a complete rehearing or
to case state the district judge to clarify whether the information he provided
was sufficient or not.
I would question whether the words, “my wife” are
insufficient. Lord Howard is married to only one person, a woman named Sandra
Howard, so those two words can relate to only one person in the entire world;
had he written “Sandra Howard” how would we know if he meant his wife or the
Vice Minister of Tourism in Colombia, for example?
There is also an argument to be had as to whether Lord
Howard should be convicted of failing to name the driver when it is accepted
that he did not know who the driver was. The purpose of section 172 is to give
the police a way of tracing drivers and to that end it punishes those
withholding information from the police. Section 172(4), gives a defence
because Parliament recognises that it would be unjust to convict people who genuinely
cannot provide the required information. In those circumstances, it seems
unjust to convict somebody for failing to spell out the name of his wife when
the court is already aware that the lady in question does not have the
information sought by the police and has, in fact, come to court to give
evidence.
Wasn't it Michael Howard that introduced that it was an offence to fail to provide the password for an encrypted device?
ReplyDeleteThe irony being that you could encrypt something, give that to Michael Howard without informing him of the key at which point there would be no defence if the password were demanded.
Thank you for these interesting articles!
ReplyDeleteIs there a possible line of defence in which Lord Howard claims having wracked his brains he believes his wife was driving, and at trial Lady Howard contents that "he believes" is not sufficient to provide certainty beyond reasonable doubt therefore she should not be convicted?
ReplyDeletePersonally I think s172 violates the Right to Silence and the Presumption of Innocence and so is an abomination. Hopefully one day it will be struck down and all convictions based on it quashed.
The default position should be that the owner is the driver unless the owner can prove otherwise (either that they simply could not have been driving - not in the country or similar - or that they can prove someone else was). Someone was using the car for speeding - whoever it was, the owner is responsible for letting them drive. That said, a true gentleman would accept the blame and take the penalty like a man.
ReplyDeleteThe use of S172 1988 RTA to remove from drivers and keepers the centuries' right to silence that is available in respect of every other criminal offence from terrorism and murder to dropping litter was confirmed in 2000 by the Privy Council, acting as the Appeal Court for Scotland, in Stott v Brown.
ReplyDeleteThe primary reason given by the judges for allowing S172 to continue to breach that right to silence was, they said, that preventing accidents trumps fundamental human rights.
By a majority of 15 to 3 the Grand Jury of the European Court of Human Rights made the same decision in O'Halloran and Francis v UK 2007, a case brought by Liberty on my behalf and that of Mr. O’Halloran. The powerful dissenting judgement by the Moldovian judge was as good an explanation as I have seen of why the ECHR was wrong and we were right. All of this information is still available on the web.
One of the worrying aspects of both cases was that no evidence of any significance was ever presented to show that speed cameras prevent accidents, it seems to have been naively assumed that they do. Since then I have spent many thousands of hours obtaining and analysing accident data in relation to speed cameras and can now prove conclusively that they do not reduce accident rates – and indeed that in some areas, eg Wales – they increase them significantly.
It seems to me that it is time for another challenge to the monstrous breach of the right to silence, based on the main premise of those two judgements simply being wrong.
Idris Francis